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EFFECT OF RESTRICTING ASSIGNABILITY OF MONEY CLAIMS.
In Bank of United States v. Public Bank of New York City,'
there was a rule of the bank which required the depositor to
appear in person to withdraw his account. The depositor
assigned his account to the plaintiff, who sought to recover from
the bank. The court held that the rule was a reasonable one
as regards the depositor, but that it would not justify the bank's
refusal to pay the assignee for the reason that the bank is a
debtor and "cannot make rules and regulations which will limit
the right to assign the debt." This leads to the inquiry whether
it is possible to make a debt non-assignable, and further, if the
debt can be made non-assignable, whether an assignment in such
a case vests in the assignee any rights and privileges?
At early common law a chose in action could not be assigned.
Later courts of law permitted the assignee to sue in the
1 151 N. Y. Supp. 26.
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assignor's name. Of course at early common law when a chose
in action could not be assigned at all, the question of the effect
of providing in express terms that the chose in action shall be
non-assignable could not arise. But when later an ordinary
money claim could be assigned, was the power to assign absolute
or could it be prevented from arising at all?
In the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, the contract
to pay money can be assigned by the creditor.2 But suppose it
is expressly stipulated, as part of the contract, that the money
claim shall be non-assignable unless debtor consents that it be
assigned. A, creditor of B, notwithstanding such a provision,
assigns the claim to C. Can C successfully sue B, who has not
consented to the assignment? The courts that have only common
law principles to guide them answer this question in the nega-
tive.3 It should be noted that in several of these cases, the
language of the agreement seemingly affects only the exercise of
the power of assignment. But the courts are prone to interpret
the intention of the parties to be that the obligee has no power
at all to assign rather than that he has power and is merely
under an obligation not to exercise it.
But notwithstanding the fact that C has no cause of action
against B, the assignment is not void to all intents and purposes.
The right to transfer the money claim never having arisen, the
law refuses to permit the assignee to sue the debtor. But inas-
much as A did make an attempted assignment to C and the
specific intent that C get the benefit of the claim will not be
effectuated at law, equity will, for the purpose of carrying out
this intent, cause A to be a constructive trustee of the claim for
C. So that where B produces money into court for interpleader,
C and not A will be entitled to the money.4 Similarly where,
after assignment to C without the consent of B, A assigns to
D with the consent of B, and B pays the money into court, it
is held that C, the first assignee, is entitled to the money.5 The
conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that though, due to
'Delaware County v. Diebold Safe Co., 133 U. S. 473, 488.
'Tabler v. Shefleld Land, Iron & Coal Co., 79 Ala. 377 (Labor tickets
marked non-transferable); Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8, 17; Murphy v.
City of Plattsmouth, 78 Neb. 163; Staples v. Somerville, 176 Mass. 237;
Mueller v. Northwestern University, 195 Ill. 236.
4 Staples v. Somerville, 176 Mass. 237. Here C was held entitled to
money as against assignee in insolvency of A.
"Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277.
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the stipulation that the claim be non-assignable, the assignee gets
no rights against the debtor, all the other legal equitable incidents
still attach to the assignment, at least where the assignee did not
know of the non-assignability.
Assuming now that we are in a jurisdiction where statute
provisions state that money claims are assignable so as to vest
the legal title of the claim in the assignee, can a transfer of a
money claim be prohibited effectually? This depends on how
the statutes should be construed. If we bear in mind the
common law principles of assignment, the obvious purpose of
the statute would seem to be merely to change the common law
rule which prevented the transfer of choses in action and which
did not permit the assignee to maintain the suit in his own
name. Upon this theory, several courts hold that the statutory
provisions do-not invalidate any agreement that the parties may
have made in regard to assignment. So that where it is agreed
that the claim shall be non-transferable, an attempted assignment
is void as between the assignee and the debtor.6 But there are
authorities holding that money claims are assignable and all
efforts to make them non-assignable are unavailing.7 What leads
these courts to such a result?
An agreement between two parties will be valid and enforced
by the courts unless it is against public policy. Is this stipulation
that the claim be non-assignable against public policy? Super-
ficially there seems to be an analogy between the restriction
imposed upon a power of alienation of choses in possession and
the restriction of assignment of a money claim. But it is sub-
mitted that to make the situations precisely analogous, A, the
owner of the assignable claim, would have to restrict the assign-
ment by his assignee. Moreover, the power of alienation of
choses in possession stands upon a footing differing from the
power to assign a claim, which is a chose in action. The owner-
ship of a tangible res should carry along as an inseparable pro-
prietary incident the power of alienation to facilitate exchange
and commercial activities. But a money claim being an intangible
res the grounds are much weaker for invoking public policy to
prevent the restriction of assignability.
'Barringer v. Bes Line Construction Co., 23 Okla. 131; La Rite v.
Groesinger, 84 Cal. 281.
'Bewick Lunzber Co. v. Hall, 94 Ga. 539 (credit check marked non-
transferable, held to be assignable). See also principal case.
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But it may be argued that the statute gives the creditor a
power to assign which the debtor cannot nullify. This, however,
is not necessarily true. The statute has only added to the con-
tent and extent of the power that the creditor was given at
common law. Hitherto the creditor had the power to grant a
privilege to an assignee to sue in the assignor's name. The
statute gave the creditor the power to extinguish his own claim
against the debtor and vest a new and corresponding claim in
the assignee against the debtor. But we have seen that the
power of assignment could be contracted away at common law.
Should we allow the power given by the statute to be contracted
away? Again we must resort to the consideration of public
policy. What was considered to not be violative of public policy
at common law may be otherwise to-day. Perhaps the legisla-
tures enacting the change in the law with regard to assignments
thought that the public weal required that secret agreements
between the original parties of which the assignee is not cognizant
should not be valid. And it can be strongly urged that the
public welfare which required a change from the common law
rules of assignment would require also that no impediment be
placed on this power of assignment unless the assignee has
notice. And just as an agent whose agency has been revoked
may still bring his principal into contractual relationship with
third parties prior to notice of this revocation, due to a naked
power with which the law vests an agent until notice, so the
law might vest the creditor with a naked power to assign in
cases where the assignee has no notice of the stibulation prohibit-
ing assignment.
But if we should attempt to make a distinction between cases
where the assignee has notice of the non-assignability and cases
where he has no notice, we are met by a serious difficulty. The
language of the statute does not permit a construction whereby
any distinction can be drawn. Either all money claims cannot
be made non-assignable, or all money claims can be made non-
assignable by express stipulation between the original parties.
The principal case plainly intimates that no money claim can
be made non-assignable. We have already seen that this result
does not necessarily follow from the statutory enactment. And
inasmuch as the freedom of the contract is of paramount impor-
tance to society, a construction of statute should be sought that
will not nullify the restriction of assignment by express agree-
ment. There being no specific language in the statute invalidat-
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ing the prohibition of transfer by express agreement, in principle,
a money claim can be made non-assignable by the original
parties.
IS THE TELEPHONIC DELIVERY OF AN INTERSTATE
TELEGRAM AN INTRASTATE TRANSACTION?
For a single charge, which was prepaid, a telegraph company
undertook to transmit a message from a point in one state to
a point in an adjoining state, to which there was no direct
telegraph line but which was connected with the nearest telegraph
office by telephone. Held, that the telephoning of the message
was a purely intrastate transaction, and the telegraph company's
liability for negligence in that particular was governed by the
law of the state of the destination of the message.'
"A telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce
as a carrier of messages that a railroad company does as a carrier
of goods,'"2 and has recently been brought within the provisions
of the Interstate Commerce Act.3 It has long been the estab-
lished law of England and of many American jurisdictions that
when the carrier accepts for carriage goods directed to a destina-
tion beyond its own route, it assumes, by the very act of
acceptance, in the absence of any express contract on the subject,
the obligation to transport them to the place to which they may
be directed.4 The majority of state courts have, however, pro-
nounced with emphasis against the rule and have held that, in
the absence of any other contract than such as is generally
implied for the acceptance of the goods for carriage, the obliga-
tion of the carrier extends only to the transportation to the end
of its route and delivery there to the next succeeding carrier to
further or complete the transportation. In order to be bound
further there must be a positive agreement, either express or
implied, extending the liability, and the burden of proof will be
upon the shipper to prove that such an agreement was made.5
The latter rule prevails in the jurisdiction of the principal case,
and assuming that the majority of the court intended that it
'Young v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 84 S. E. (N. C.) 45.
Two judges dissented.
'Chief Justice Waite in Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 1o5 U. S. 46o.
'U. S. Comp. St. 1913, §8563.
"Hutchinson on Carriers, 3d ed., §§228-3o.
'Hutchinson on Carriers, 3d ed., §231.
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should apply and that in admitting liability of the defendant for
negligence it had reference to its liability as a forwarding agent,
yet we cannot escape the view that there was but a single contract
for the transmission of the message to its ultimate destination
to be performed entirely by the defendant, in part, it is true, by
the instrumentality of the telephone. But the telephone company
did not act as a 'connecting carrier' or have anything to do with
the handling of the message as such; there was no delivery of
the message to the telephone company for transmission but simply
a hiring of its services by the defendant. Undoubtedly the
telephoning of the message would have been an intrastate transac-
tion had it been done at the instance of the addressee, or if it
had been handled by the telephone company on a special contriact
limited with its own lines, and without dividing charges with
any other carrier or assuming any obligations to or for it6 ; but
that is not the case which is presented to us. Here the carrier,
by undertaking to deliver beyond the end of its line, transformed
the contract which the law of the jurisdiction made for it into
such a contract as the English law would have made for it. We
cannot'regard the telephoning of the message in this instance
as materially differing from the telephonic delivery of the ordi-
nary message within ordinary delivery limits; it was simply the
delivery which the defendant chose to consider itself bound to
make as a part of a single contract to transmit the message. The
rule which the majority of the court would establish would con-
stitute each relay in the transmission of a telegram a separate
undertaking and it seems clearly erroneous.
a i Barnes on Interstate Transportation, i2o; Judson on Interstate Com-
merce, 2d ed., §14o.
